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This thesis makes a comparison of aerial targets manage-
ment with other Navy Program Management organizations. This
comparison is used to highlight reasons for the Program
Sponsor's disproportionate time expenditure on the aerial
targets' portion of his duties. Three areas are examined in
detail that contribute to this situation: a) Program Spon-
sor unfamiliarity with the aerial targets management organi-
zation, b) aerial targets organizational structures, and
c) key aerial target management issues. Several changes are
recommended to help alleviate the identified problem areas.
Long term improvements involve changes in the conceptual
framework employed in the following areas: a) requirements
determination, b) hardware vs. software targets, c) mainte-
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I. IM'RODUCTION
Aerial targets is a generic grouping of all airborne
devices (sub-scale, full-scale, and towed) used to provide
fleet training and to support the research, development,
test, and evaluation (RDT&E) community. Their management at
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) level is conducted under
the Deputy for Air Warfare (OP-05). (See Fig. 1). Specifi-
cally, they are assigned for program sponsorship to the
Aircraft/Weapons Requirements Branch (OP-506) within the
Aviation Plans and Requirements Division (OP-50). (See Fig.
2). In recent years, the Program Sponsor for the aerial
targets program has been assigned concurrently to the F-4
aircraft program. The incumbent in this position, histori-
cally a Navy Captain, has experienced considerable difficulty
performing the aerial targets' portion of his duties. In
spite of the similarity in magnitude of resources (dollars)
managed, the Program Sponsor has been required to delegate
disproportionate amounts of his time to the management of
the aerial targets.
Resolution of this problem has not commanded adequate
attention because competing programs such as the F-I8, F-l4,
or even F-^ major modification efforts demanded priority.
However, with the critical manpower problems facing today's
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time would he ill advised. If trends continue, these top
level managers in CNO can be expected to cover more programs,
not fewer.
Within this environment of constrained manpower and lack
of enthusiasm towards aerial targets, this thesis investi-
gated OP-506's problem. Three areas were examined:
1. Unfamiliarity of the Program Sponsor with the aerial
target management organizations, their roles and their
interrelationships
.
2. Organizational structure differences between aerial
targets and aircraft m.anagement teams.
3. Key management issues relating to aerial targets that
are not being addressed.
The objectives of this three phased analysis effort were
twofold. First, to provide a training tool/guide for incom-
ing Program Sponsors, thereby overcoming their lack of famil-
iarity with the peculiarities of the aerial targets mission,
management organization, and management problems. Accomplish-
ment of this objective is achieved by the text of this thesis,
Second, to recommend corrective actions that would improve
the overall program management of aerial targets.
While improving Program Sponsor knowledge of the aerial
targets program will initially improve the situation, the
long term solution lies in the successful initiation of the
recommendations relating to organizational structure and key
management issues. If implemented, they will insure better
management support to the Program Sponsor, allowing a supe-
rior allocation of his scarce time and efforts between aerial




Prior to 1975, the management organization for the aerial
targets program within NAVAIR supporting the Program Sponsor
in CNO, could best be characterized as fragmented, under-
funded, and under-supported. What little management that
did exist was spread between the following three organizations
1. PMA-247, consisting of a Navy Captain and one GS-12,
was charged with the overall life cycle program manage-
ment for all aerial targets [10].
2. AIR-535 was responsible for the engineering and m.ate-
rial acquisition aspects of aerial targets and responded
to PMA-247 through the NAVAIR matrix management arrange-
ment .
3. AIR-4104 was responsible for all logistics aspects of
aerial targets and reported to the PMA in the same
manner as AIR-535 [11].
In spite of being charged with managing all aerial tar-
gets, new and existing, these organizations dealt primarily
with developing, procuring, and supporting new aerial targets.
In service targets received little priority and were managed
in the classical reactionary mode. Also disjointed and
suffering from the lack of dedicated management, at this
time, were the Navy ranges (used for test and evaluation and
training) . The Navy was faced with either DOD level micro-
management or loss of the ranges to a joint service manage-
ment team [10]. Confronted with these and several other
management problems, NAVAIR attempted to improve the situation
by creating a new organizational entity titled the Deputy
Commander for Test and Evaluation (AIR-06),
12

As initially envisioned, this new management organiza-
tion was comprised of a triumverate of flag rank officers:
AIR-06, Deputy Commander for Test and Evaluation, located
in Washington, D.C.; AIR-06R, Ranges and Targets, located
at the Pacific Missile Test Center, Pt . Mugu, California;
and the Naval Air Test Center, Patujcent River, Maryland ClOj.
This organization did provide much needed visibility
and some additional support for aerial targets managment
,
but still left the management very fragmented. To eliminate
this fragmentation, the newly consolidated headquarters
functions (PMA-247, AIR-535, AIR-4104) were moved to the
Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC), joined with AIR-O6R,
and renamed Director for Targets and Ranges (AIR-63O).
The consolidation and merger, however, did not take place
painlessly. Amongst PMA-247, AIR-535, AIR-4104, and other
ancillary NAVAIR codes, there were approximately 50 people
spending in excess of fifty percent of their time on aerial
targets. However, when the consolidation, merger, and tran-
sition of AIR-630 to PMTC occurred, only 15 billets were
provided—and no people [10].
The inadequate support to OP-506, and the resultant in-
ordinate time expenditure on aerial targets management by
OP-506, can be traced in large part to the disruption caused
by this realignment effort and the lack of NAVAIR headquarters
trained aerial target experts assigned to the program. How-
ever, in the five years since this reorganization, much of
the disruption associated with the establishment of AIR-63O
13

has been overcome. One must look further to fully understand
OP-506's responsibilities and problems in managing the aerial
targets. In order to do this, one must examine all the orga-
nizational entities, their roles, and their interrelationships
keeping in mind the turmoil and learning process of the key
supporting player to OP-506—AIR-630. The concerned organi-
zational entities are the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
the Chief of Naval Material (CNM), the Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIR), the Pacific Missile Test Center CPMTC), the




III. AERIAL TARGETS MANAGEMENT PARTICIPANTS
A. CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (OP-506)
As the senior Navy official responsible for management
of the aerial targets program, the OP-506 Program Sponsor
sits at the apex of a dual channel management system. One
channel may be viewed as the "user" input channel with the
other as the "producer" input channel. (See Fig. 3). In
this "dual-hatted" position, the Program Sponsor takes on
aspects of both roles.
To the "user" community, who generate requirements for
existing aerial targets and/or new aerial targets, the Pro-
gram Sponsor takes on the role of producer or provider of
targets to meet their needs. To the "producer" community,
who must procure, manage, and support the aerial targets,
OP-506 takes on the role of user or requirements generator.
Regardless of the channel, however, the Program Sponsor's




Details of these functions are delineated in Appendix A.
The first of these functions, requirements determination,
can be viewed from two perspectives; requirements for new
aerial targets and requirements for existing aerial targets.
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1. New threats that arise due to the development of new
weapons systems by forces hostile to the United States.
2. The need to test the capability of new weapon systems
developed by the U.S. Navy.
One example of this type of effort is the Firebrand target
being developed as an Anti-Ship Missile Target in order to
simulate the performance characteristics of a projected,
hostile cruise type missile. These types of requirements
(for new aerial targets) are much less frequent than the
yearly exercise of determining utilization requirements for
targets currently in the inventory.
For existing targets, requirements determination is a
function of the following factors:
1. Training allowance—how many training missiles will be
allocated to the fleet for surface-to-air and air-to-
air training.
2. Procurement/deliveries—how many targets have been
procured in previous years, their production lead
time, and projected delivery schedule.
3. Historical trends—which missiles are shot at which
aerial targets, how many presentations of each target
before it is killed, and the operational loss rate for
targets not killed.
4. Inventory level and objective—minimum on hand level
of aerial targets considering utilization rates, rework
pipeline, and operational availability factors.
5. User inputs—stated aerial target requirements from
CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT, OPTEVFOR, and CNM [13].
Having determined the individual users aerial target
requirements utilizing the above inputs, the Program Sponsor
next must allocate the aerial targets. This is a difficult
job to accomplish because past, present, and projected future
budget constraints have seriously depleted the inventory of
17

operationally ready aerial targets. Even with careful atten-
tion to this allocation effort, the Navy will run out of
aerial targets in the 1983-198^ timeframe unless FY-8I, 82,
and 83 funding is increased [13J . Thus, the target alloca-
tion process is an attempt to equitably spread the shortfall
and resultant dissatisfaction.
The current OP-506 management philosophy/prioritization
for allocating the aerial targets results from the following
methodology
:
1. Attem.pt to provide OPTEVPOR with 100^ of their stated
requirements. This is done because past experience
has shown that OPTEVFOR is very accurate in assessing
their needs. This is attributed to the fact that
OPTEVFOR's efforts are task/test oriented with clearly
defined objectives.
2. Compare CINCLANTFLT/CINCPACFLT' s stated requirements
with projected usage based on training missile allow-
ance and historical trends. If they agree, provide
100^ of their requirements. If computations do not
agree, attempt to determine if there have been train-
ing scenario changes that would significantly alter
the historical trends.
3. Treat CNM's stated requirements with some skepticism.
Their stated requirements (a consolidation of NAVAIR,
NAVSEA, and FMS requirements) have historically been
orders of magnitude overstated. Consequently, allocate
whatever aerial targets are left in yearly allocation
totals after fulfilling all other users needs and after
carefully considering long term inventory implications.
If unprotected "hard" requirements arise, make mid-year
adjustments to CNM's allocation [I3J.
Obviously these procedures can not be followed blindly.
Timing, special needs, and most of all judgement must be added
The third, main area of Program Sponsor effort and con-
cern is in budgeting. Financial budgeting and appropriation
are the vital link between the requirements determination and
18

allocation process; both are possible only within the context
of the availability of funds.
Funding to support the aerial targets program is of three
types: RDT&E, WPN, and O&MN. RDT&E funds are used for all
aerial target development work and for the procurement of all
aerial targets utilized in RDT&E of new or improved weapon
systems. With respect to the efforts that RDT&E funds, OP-506
is both the resource and mission sponsor—a true Program
Sponsor [13].
WPN funds are used for production, acquisition, and en-
gineering support of all fully developed, qualified, and
approved for fleet training targets. Unlike the RDT&E funds,
however, the VJPN resource sponsor is both OP-03, Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations, Surface Warfare and OP-05, DCNO Air
Warfare. Thus, OP-506 as the Program Sponsor is lacking
total control over the requisite funds and must coordinate/
negotiate with OP-03 for the scarce resources [13 j 14]. The
relationship of the RDT&E and VJPN fund accounts is depicted
in Figure 4
.
O&MN funds are utilized for operation and maintenance
of all targets operated in the fleet. Again as in the WPN
funds, the resource sponsor is separate from the OP-506
Program/Mission Sponsor. The O&MN resource sponsor is OP-51.
(See Fig. 2). This requires, as in the case of the VJPN
funds, skillful coordination/negotiation to obtain an equi-


































































These three task areas, requirements determination, re-
source allocation, and budget coordination/negotiation,
consume a disproportionate amount of the Program Sponsor's
time in the management of aerial targets. However, one must
not assume that this problem results solely from the diffi-
culty of these tasks relative to aerial targets since these
are much the same tasks that the targets Program Sponsor
performs for his other assigned programs (F-3, F-5, F-^, VX-4,
Navy Fighter Weapons School, and three joint Air Force/Navy
projects). Thus, one must look to the supporting organiza-
tions for cause. These organization (CNM, NAVAIR, PMTC,
NV/C, and NADC) by charter provide much of the input data
upon which the target Program Sponsor's efforts rely.
B. CHIEF OF NAVAL MATERIAL (CNM)
CNM is the senior executive level link between the Pro-
gram Sponsor (in his user role) and the various supporting
management organizations in NAVAIR, PMTC, NWC, and NADC.
Relative to aerial targets, the key individual within CNM
resides in the Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Acquisi-
tion, MAT-08. (See Fig. 5). Specifically, aerial targets
management at the CNM level is assigned to the Acquisition
Review Office, MAT-O8DC. (See Fig. 6).
Because of the position of CNM between CNO and the other
supporting organizations, they would be expected to have a
key role in all management decisions and data generated in
support of the Program Sponsor. This is not the case. As































































CNM representative J his primary concern is the acquisition
of new/existing aerial targets; i.e. the task of acquiring
targets to maintain and support a proper inventory. His
aerial target responsibilities are, for all practical pur-
poses, collateral duties to his primary function as secre-
tariat of the Acquisition Review Committee [12, I3II
.
Therefore, the current and recent past CNM aerial target
representatives have had minimal involvement in OP-506's
other major interest areas of resource allocation and bud-
geting. Data in these areas from NAVAIR, PMTC, NWC, and
NADC has been passed essentially unfiltered to CNO I13].
Program Sponsors in OP-506 have come to expect this
degree of support/expertise at CNM. Thus the CNr4 aerial
targets management representative has become essentially a
formal wicket which must be passed but which provides very
little useful support or data screening for the Program
Sponsor in CNO.
C. NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND (NAVAIR)
NAVAIR provides the primary program management support
to the CNO Program Sponsor. This includes, via a Memorandum
of Understanding, those aerial targets used in support of
NAVSEA for ships qualification trials [10, 12] . This manage-
ment support resides within the Deputy Commander for Test
and Evaluation, AIR-O6, and is physically divided between
Washington, D.C. and Pt . Mugu, California.
One individual resides in NAVAIR headquart'ers , Code
AIR-63OL, in Washington, D. C. He functions in a liaison
24

role between the remaining AIR-63O program management team
at Pt . Mugu and the functional divisions (finance, contracts,
technical, logistics) within NAVAIR. Even though program
management and all support functions are theoretically at
Pt . Mugu, an informal organization exists which relies on
some of the skills/talents still in Washington, D. C, thus
necessitating this key liaison position [10, 11].
The primary program management support personnel to the
Program Sponsor are the AIR-63O organizations located at the
Pacific Missile Test Center, Pt . Mugu, California. It should
be noted, that even though physically located at Pt . Mugu
(Camarillo), AIR-63O is functionally a part of NAVAIR head-
quarters, coming under NAVAIR' s ceiling constraints and pay-
roll. The AIR-630 organization is depicted in Figure 7.
This organization functions as the NAVAIR Project Manager
for aerial targets as defined in NAVAIRINST 5000.8 [I]. This
includes life cycle management for design, development, ac-
quisition, initial logistics support and major modifications
of all aerial targets. As such they collect, analyze, and
provide the majority of the data upon which the Program
Sponsor relies to make his requirements determinations, re-
source allocations, and budget decisions. (A detailed
description of AIR-630's functions is provided as Appendix B).
The principal supporting documentation provided by AIR-63O
to the Program Sponsor for his tasks is as follows;
1, Inventory objective—this key element in OP-506's re-
quirements determination process is calculated by
taking the peak month operational requirements (for
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considerations, and dividing by target availability
LlQl,
2. Historical trends—which missiles are shot at which
target, the number of presentations per target, and
the operational loss rate.
3. Target allocation analysis—comparison of user stated
requirements vs. allocations vs. actual expenditures.
4. Budgeting data—includes planned procurements/deliveries
for aerial targets, projected acquisition and logistic
support costs for aerial targets and for major modifi-
cation programs.
The bulk of this information is provided quarterly to OP-506
in accordance with OPNAVINST 3110. 18R [6].
A quick reflection on the magnitude of AlR-630's task,
their support requirements to OP-506, and their staff as
depicted in Figure 7 will readily point out a glaring dispar-
ity. As manned, they can only provide the middle management
support to the Program Sponsor. Detailed data analysis for
the required technical and logistic support must be augmented
from another organization—the Pacific Missile Test Center.
D. PACIFIC MISSILE TEST CENTER (PMTC)
PMTC provides the detailed technical and logistic support
to the program manager (AIR-63O) in very much the same manner
as the AIR-05 (technical) and AIR-04 (logistics) functional
divisions support a program manager located in NAVAIR head-
quarters .
Referring to Figure 7 for the AIR-630 organization, PMTC
is staffed with one technical and one logistic expert to
support each of the aerial target product lines identified
under AIR-6301 [10]. Their charter and responsibilities are
27

defined by NAVAIRINST 5^00. 14b which establishes and defines
the Cognizant Field Activity (CFA) concept [2]. Under this
concept, primarily for out of production programs, a Navy
field activity Gin this case PMTC) provides the detailed
engineering and logistic support analysis efforts to support
and substantiate the decisions of the program manager CAIR-63O)
This support effort includes maintenance data collection and
analyses, supply support, training and trainers, rework
specifications, publication update and maintenance, design
change development or procurement, etc.
In summary, one can visualize PMTC in this CFA function
as the essential working level connection between the aerial
target users and their producers. By data collection and
analysis of user (fleet) problems, they support AIR-630's
program management role/decisions. AIR-630 in turn supports
the OP-506 Program Sponsor in his higher level management,
budget, and policy decisions.
E. NAVAL WEAPONS CENTER (NWC) AND NAVAL AIR DEVELOPMENT
CENTER (NADC)
Two other key organizations involved in the overall aerial
targets management that one must be aware of and deal with
in order to understand the complete magnitude/diversity of
OP-506 's support team are NWC China Lake, California and
NADC Johnsville, Pennsylvania.
The mission of NWC is to be the principal Navy RDT&E
center for air warfare systems and missile weapon systems.
One of the requirements resulting from this mission is to
28

have appropriate aerial targets capable of demonstrating
the desired performance of the RDT&E weapons. Often times
this requires a new target or modification to an existing
target. Therefore, NWC has developed a significant engineer-
ing expertise in aerial targets. Today they support AIR-63O
and subsequently the OP-506 Program Sponsor by performing
all of the Navy's design and development work on full scale
targets. In addition, they provide an alternative engineer-
ing capability to the CFA personnel at PMTC and to the prime
aerial target manufacturers. This capability is being util-
ized by AIR-630 via AIRTASK type arrangements to provide
additional technical depth and, consequently, better technical
support to OP-506.
NADC, like NWC, has provided support to AIR-630 and OP-506
in the front end or m.ission need/concept formulation stage
of aerial target development. They are charged via an ongoing
AIRTASK to be the environment scanners for AIR-63O and ulti-
mately OP-506. In this role they must survey the fleet users
to identify what the fleet feels are new aerial target re-
quirements. Moreover, they must scrutinize the intelligence
data/community to identify new threats which must be simulated
by aerial targets. These inputs are then transformed into
proposals for AIR-630 and OP-506 to budget for new and/or




F. MANAGEMENT SUPPORT TEAM—SUMT^ARY
Fragmented and decentralized are perhaps the best words
to describe the several organizations charged with supporting
the aerial targets Program Sponsor. This fragmentation and
decentralization contributes significantly to OP-506's prob-
lem. However, many other Navy programs are managed similiarly
without overly stressing their Program Sponsor. Thus, one
must now compare this management support organization to




IV. MANAGEMENT SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONAL COMPARISONS
The Navy's management team supporting the Program Sponsor
in CNO varies with the system life cycle as follows:
1. PMA—This is the title applied to the manager/management
organization of the major systems from the earliest
planning phase up through at least the first few years
of full scale production. The PMA resides within NAVAIR,
has a small staff, and is supported by the NAVAIR func-
tional organization in a classical matrix arrangement.
2. APC— At some point during production when the program
stabilizes sufficiently and less high level visibility
is desired, the project migrates from a PMA to an APC
concept. This title (and charter) applies to the cen-
tralized management organization until late in the air-
craft life cycle—the end of production or perhaps later.
Except for name, and perhaps prestige, there is essen-
tially no difference between a PMA and an APC.
3. WSM—Once the program reaches a point where all
production and/or major modifications are complete,
the major emphasis becomes sustaining engineering/
logistics support. At this point the APC is disestab-
lished and the project management function and functional
support is physically transferred to a field activity,
generally the CFA.
Figure 8 depicts all three of the project management type
organizations and their relationships in the overall Navy
management structure. (For purposes of this thesis, CNO
refers to the OP-506 Program Sponsor).
A review of the complete aerial target management team
organization discussed in the previous section will reveal
that it most closely parallels the Weapon System Manager
(WSM) phase of life cycle project management. Figure 9
depicts this parallel by adding the essential aerial target
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significant parallel features of aerial targets and weapon
systems management are the following:
1. Both function with essentially only one liaison man
in Washington, D. C.
2. Both project management offices are remotely located
and co-located with their respective cognizant field
activity.
3. Both rely heavily through an informal organization on
certain functional groups within NAVAIR headquarters.
In spite of the noticeable similarity of physical and
functional organization, there are several distinct differ-
ences which are noteworthy:
1. Aerial targets program management reports through
AIR-06 to CNO vs. through AIR-01.
2. AIR-06 is headed by a Navy Captain whereas AIR-01 is
headed by a Rear Admiral.
3. Aerial targets are still in production whereas programs
under WSM control are generally out-of-production.
4. Aerial targets CFA is a test activity whereas the WSM
CFA is a Navy depot rework facility.
5. Aerial targets program management, even though physi-
cally remote from NAVAIR headquarters, is functionally
a part of NAVAIR whereas a WSM is physically and func-
tionally removed from NAVAIR headquarters.
6. Aerial targets program office supports a diverse group
of equipments with fewer people than a typical WSM
with a homogeneous weapon system, more people, and
larger CFA support.
7. Some of the aerial targets technical support (NADC and
NWC) is physically and functionally fragmented from
the project office and the CFA whereas all essential
technical support for the WSM is generally co-located
at the respective CFA.
While all of these differences can be a source of diffi-
culty for the Program Sponsor because of the lack of similar-
ity with aircraft programs, some are simply organizationally
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inefficient. Perhaps the biggest structural weakness is the
reporting chain-of-command through AIR-O6. By reporting
through AIR-O6 (non-program management oriented), the aerial
targets program manager lacks the required leverage and
visibility that is inherent in the AIR-01 reporting chain.
This is very significant when trying to run a program (that
may still be in production) from a decentralized location.
A similar problem existed (until December 1979) for the V/SMs
when their reporting chain-of-command was through AlR-04.
The Jessen Study of NAVAIR's organization, in recognition of
the magnitude of dollars spent in the later stages of a
weapon system life cycle, recommended continuous program
management under/through AIR-01 [14J. This was recently
accomplished for WSMs via NAVAIRINST 5^00. 70A [4J.
The second most glaring weakness in the aerial target
project management organization is the fragmentation of
technical support. This alone v/ould probably be insignificant
if AIR-630 was located in V/ashington, D. C. with the leverage
and visibility of a PMA and ready access to the OP-506 Pro-
gram Sponsor. However, when remotely located in California,
and the resulting decreased response time to OP-506, this
fragmentation of technical support can only cause further
erosion of the program manager's capabilities and support
to OP-506.
While these two organizational shortcomings in the pro-
gram management support team are very important, one should
not conclude that they are the only organizational structure
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sources of OP-506's problems. Perhaps the most significant
organizational problem lies within CNO itself. Specifically,
reference is made to the split of resource and mission spon-
sorship of the WPN funds as discussed earlier. This violates
principles of good management and has been recognized as a
shortcoming in DOD management systems by the Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel [8], the Committee on Government Operations
(Major Systems Acquisition Reforms) [9], and the previously
mentioned Jessen Study. All of these studies point to the
necessity to have the control of financial resources coinci-
dent with the functional responsibility and authority. This
could be corrected very easily by making the OP-506 Program
Sponsor the resource sponsor for aerial targets WPN funds.
This would appear to be a more pressing need than to have a
single resource sponsor for all V/PN funds. If this alterna-
tive is too politically impalatable, a formalized Memorandum
of Understanding, as a minimum, would be in order.
Unfamiliarity and organizational weakness contribute
significantly to OP-506 's difficulties in managing the aerial
targets program. However, a third and most im.portant source
of difficulty is the failure of the entire management team





One of the key management initiatives to arise in the
federal sector in the mid-1970 's was the concept of stating
requirements in terms of the service's mission. This con-
cept, which is spelled out in detail in 0MB Circular No.
A-109j places primary emphasis on the early stages of weapon
systems development, stressing the obligation to identify
missions, deficiencies in capabilities to fulfill these
missions, and resultant programs to fill the gap [53. This
differs significantly from the previous procedures where
requirements were formulated in hardware terms, often times
based on contractor promised capability/systems, and then
working backwards to a need and/or mission. The aerial
targets community still largely functions in the latter
fashion.
With very few exceptions, aerial target systems in the
Navy inventory today were developed in the mid-1960's. This
would imply that the Navy's mission and the threat thereto
have not changed since the mid-1960's or that they still
provide in 198O an adequate representation of the opposing
threat. Both of these hypotheses seem ridiculous. If that




The explanations most often cited are the lack of funds
and the escalation that has made aerial targets a very expen-
sive, expendable piece of equipment. While these reasons
must certainly be part of the answer, they are not the com-
plete answer. A significant contributor is the Navy's
failure, for whatever reason, to state its full spectrum of
aerial targets requirements in understandable, defendable
mission needs. And, therein, lies the Catch-22 of the situa-
tion. Without the A-109 type of assessment, the funding will
never be forthcoming.
The picture is no more encouraging when one looks at the
other main role of the Navy's aerial targets—testing the
capabilities of the Navy's own weapon systems. Again since
targets have remained relatively, technologically stable from
the mid-1960 's, an uneducated observer m.ight suspect that
Navy weapons had not improved their capability or the targets
were way ahead of their time. One only needs to be slightly
cognizant of the technological advances of the 1970 's to know
that neither of these two suspicions can be valid.
The explanation lies in how targets for this purpose are
funded and in the system rewards and human nature of a Navy
Program Manager. If a program manager's weapon system is so
new and sophisticated that no existing target will adequately
test it, then he must budget and provide funding for the new
target from his weapon system funds. With ever present cost
growth this is one of the first items to be sacrificed even
if it appears initially in the budget [103. Moreover, the
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benchmark for a program manager's performance in today's
economic environment is geared to cost and schedule. Per-
formance is taking a back seat. In addition, human nature
drives the dedicated program manager to strive for success.
A truly representative aerial target to completely certify
the performance of his weapon system would increase the
likelihood of failure. Therefore, most programs such as the
F-I8 or F-14 elect to get by with existing aerial targets.
Until the Navy can force on itself the necessary disci-
pline to address these two shortcomings in the requirements
determination arena and admit that the Navy's aerial targets
just do not replicate the threat, the OP-506 Program Sponsor
will continually inherit inventory problems and funding
shortfalls
.
B. HARDWARE VS. SOFTWARE TARGETS
A closely allied issue to the requirements determination
problem is the question of the degree of realism provided
by a hardware, aerial target. The requirement for this type
of target in its training role appears to be a holdover from
the "good-old-days" of see and be seen aviation and from the
lack of mission analysis discussed previously.
A careful examination of the situation would raise some
real questions relative to this philosophy. From the U.S.'s
own capabilities and ongoing R&D efforts, standoff weapons
with 200 mile ranges are no myth. In addition, hypersonic
speed capability Capprox. Mach 4) is not far away. Possess-
ing these capabilities in the U. S. military arsenal, can
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one dare assume less of the forces hostile to the U. S.?
Given these types of performance parameters for an in-
coming weapon, the concept of a target that one can see and
see that it has been hit is incomprehensible. Electronic
or software type targets for training purposes offer more
realism and perhaps significant cost advantages.
Much, if not all, of the technology for a software type
target methodology is well in hand. Sophisticated aircraft
simulators are available. Computer control, simulation, data
storage and real time telecommunications are available. High
resolution, realistic display technology is available. In
short, the capability exists to more accurately simulate a
realistic engagement scenario, if that is one's goal.
More disciplined, front end, mission oriented require-
ments determination will hopefully lead to the philosophical
change required to initiate the substitution of software for
hardware targets. Software targets v;ill not eliminate the
need for hardware type targets. However, the current mix of
the two appears incorrect, especially when constrained by the
economics of the situation.
C. MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY
The third key management issue that needs addressing in
order to help alleviate the Program Sponsor's problems is
that of the aerial targets maintenance philosophy. The
current maintenance concept is very much like that of an
aircraft or missile system with the exception that there is
no established depot maintenance/rework capability for aerial
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targets. The assumption is that the target will be expended,
either via a kill or an operational loss , prior to the equip-
ment within the target requiring depot level maintenance.
The difficulties associated with this maintenance philos-
ophy are the following:
1. Paralleling aircraft/missile maintenance concepts is
resulting in inordinate expenditures of maintenance
manhours for scheduled inspection. This is especially
true in full-scale targets and is tied to the philos-
ophy of maintaining full-scale targets man-rated.
2. Significant numbers of aerial targets are surviving to
a point in their life where some sort of depot level
maintenance is required or desirable. Part of this
old age problem is generated by the target inventory
shortage and the resultant slow down in expenditures
in order to cover the mid-1980 's inventory shortfall.
3. Lack of depot level maintenance capability forces any
significant modification/repair program to be contract-
ed out. Moreover, lack of this in-house capability
eliminates a vital source of firsthand information for
the CFA in its technical support role.
Recognizing these difficulties and realizing the manpower
and budget environment constraining the program, what alter-
natives are available? First, and foremost, would be a
tailoring of the aerial target scheduled maintenance require-
ments in light of their mission and operation. This is
already underway for the full-scale target QF-4B and could
be expanded to the sub-scale and towed target systems (tow
reels )
.
Secondly, some depot capability is needed. Ideally this
would be at PMTC to allow the CFA hands on experience. This
approach, however, would run counter to prevailing forces
that are dictating depot consolidation and interservice
arrangements. Recognizing this trend, the remaining
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possibilities to gain this depot capability are the following;
1. An existing depot
—
perhaps one of the two that reworks
missiles or NARF North Island that reworks fleet F-4's
and has limited experience with QF-4 ' s
.
2. Commercial rework contract.
Barring any depot capability and recognizing the lack of
funds and glamour associated with aerial targets, a radical
approach would be a complete "turnkey" operation [10]. In
this management style, the Navy would own the targets but
the target manufacturer would have total responsibility for
target presentations, technical performance, logistic support,
recovery, refurbishment, etc. Limited experience is available
on this approach in the Army and could prove beneficial to
the Navy.
In summary, the current maintenance concept needs rethink-
ing. In its present form it has significant weaknesses and
these weaknesses contribute to the overall management problem
of the Program Sponsor by adversely affecting target availa-
bility.
D. TRAINING/PERSONNEL SUPPORT
Two significant points need to be recalled in order to
discuss this fourth management issue. First, when AIR-63O,
the program manager, was formulated, no personnel with a
background in aerial targets and with NAVAIR headquarters
experience were transferred to PMTC. Experience was gained
via trial and error on the job; the program management is
just now recovering after five years. Secondly, the program
manager's staff is one deep for each family of targets with
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roughly a two man support cadre for each family of targets
residing in the CFA. This is much less than comparably
sized programs. Thus, a significant issue arises as to how
to provide additional depth to the program management team
and how to train upcoming personnel to provide continuity
and relief for personnel that leave for whatever reason.
Additional depth can come from one of two basic sources
—
in-house Navy or out-house (contractor). The latter method
seems to be in vogue today for many reasons primary of which
are the ease with which contractor support can be procured,
the direct control over contractor personnel via the purse
string, and the feeling that available contractor personnel
have more talent. This is the approach the current aerial
target program manager is pursuing [10].
Alternatively, additional support in-house would be




perhaps additional interest and support for pro-
gram management functions could be gleaned informally
from PMTC. Many of the aerial targets are operated
and maintained (intermediate level) at PMTC. With
proper motivation, and if required funding via AIRTASK,
additional support could be provided. This relation-
ship would then be very similar to the working rela-
tionship between an aircraft CFA engineering/logistics
team and the depot production personnel.
2. NWC
—
perhaps additional support could be secured by
expansion of the current AIRTASK arrangements.
3. NADC— same option as NWC.
4. NARF—a potential source of additional support may be
a technical/logistics team experienced in the CFA
function which is experiencing decreased workload.
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An ejiample would be the F-4 CFA at NARF North Island.
AIRTASKS could be executed to formalize such an arrange-
ment ,
The training issue is intimately tied to the personnel
support problem. V/ithout more depth of people than currently
exists, each vacancy is traumatic, creating a void, and has
only a small cadre from which to be filled. More depth will
provide better support all the way up the line and provide
a larger base of semi-experienced personnel to move up and
into vacancies. The connection between training and the
additional people support is simple and direct. If the latter
issue is addressed via out-house methods, trained/experienced
relief personnel will remain a problem. If managed in-house,
then trained/experienced personnel are far easier to provide.
Thus, the two sides of this issue present management
with a difficult tradeoff. On the one side is contracting
out with its ease and almost immediate response time but
lack of long term generation of experienced people. On the
other hand is additional in-house support with its political
and administrative difficulties and slower response time,
but better long term capability to provide experienced re-
placement personnel. The choice is not clear. However, the




An understanding of aerial targets management organiza-
tion, roles, interrelationships, and problems will definitely
accrue to the Program Sponsor who reads and comprehends the
issues herein. However, understanding and comprehension will
only marginally improve upon his difficulties as Program
Sponsor in OP-506. What is required to materially improve
aerial targets management is positive action addressing the
management organization structure and management issue
problems
.
In this regard, the following actions are recommended as
a first step in improving the overall aerial targets manage-
ment and the support to OP-506:
1. Structure the Aerial Targets' program management along
the lines of a WSM by moving the liaison function
TAIR-63QL) to AIR-01 (under APC-1, Fig, b) and by
chartering AIR-63O as the Aerial Targets WSM . This
will provide a vital parallel to the program manage-
ment of other major programs within NAVAIR with a
resultant increase in leverage and visibility. In
addition this change will provide a program management
organization which can assimilate the APC-6 functions
(Fig. 7) as that program phases out of production.
2. Consolidate NWC and NADC functions at AIR-630/PMTC .
Fragmentation of a program remotely located from
Washington, D. C. is a serious flaw. Co-locating
these responsibilities with the program manager will
provide AIR-63O with a greater life cycle perspective,
consolidate scarce personnel resources, and increase
response unity/time to the OP-506 Program Sponsor.
3. Give OP-506 the Resource Sponsor authority and function
for aerial target WPN funds . The split of resources
and mission responsibility for aerial targets within
CNO necessitates significant negotiation/coordination
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problems for the Program Sponsor. Moreover, this dis-
joint violates all management principals and DOD
management studies. Though more difficult than the
other alternative—a Memorandum of Understanding be-
tween OP-03 and OP-05—the suggested approach will be
longer lasting, less dependent upon the personalities
of the individuals, and provide more relief to OP-506
relative to his time constraints in managing aerial
targets.
Contract with a Gonsu:Itant for a det;ailed mission/threat
analysis , an ana.lysis of Navy aerial targe t capab ili-
ties to replicat e the threat
,
and concepts (both hard-
ware and software) to fill the gap . Independent
,
out-house analysis/recommendations are required because
of the stagnation of ideas and lack of credibility
currently existing in-house. Only a detailed investi-
gation, stated in harsh terms associated to Navy mission,
and representative of 1980's technology and warfare
environment can hope to provide the documentation
required to reverse the funding/inventory trends.
5
.
Attempt to quantify the relationship between aerial
target availability/allocation and fleet Anti-Air
Warfare readiness . Currently, no one can assess the
impact on Anti-Air Warfare readiness if, for example,
only 200 targets are allocated against a requirement
for 500 targets. Any assessment would be guesswork.
If a qualitative and/or quantitative impact assessment
tool could be developed, the Program Sponsor could
more easily defend his requested funding. In addition,
this would provide an excellent short term aid to the
funding/inventory problem which recommendation number
four addresses in the long term.
6 Establish in-house depot level capability on aerial
targets . The slow down in usage caused by inventory
shortages, the trend toward recoverable targets, and
the increased unit cost of targets all dictate a need
for depot capability. Spin-off benefits in technical
expertise will be gained via hands on experience.
Because of manpower and political constraints, careful
planning must proceed implementation of this strategy
in order to determine the best location—PMTC or an
existing Navy depot.
7 Tailor the maintenance program for aerial targets .
Significant O&MN savings are feasible if maintenance
procedures are carefully matched to the target's
mission and operational environment. Additional
benefits will be gained in overall target availability.
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8 . Provide additional depth of personnel In-house .
The primary source should be PMTC, Benefits to be
gained are personnel with more direct hands on experi-
ence, a closer parallel to WSMs, and the ability to
provide experience and training to individuals who can
backfill positions as vacancies occur. Ultimately
this increased depth and training will appear as in-
creased capability and responsiveness to the OP-506
Program Sponsor.
These eight recommendations comprise a significant first
step in improving the overall program management support to
the Program Sponsor. A major second step looms ahead, how-
ever, in implementing the results of the study effort contained
in recommendation number four. And as a final step, feedback
monitoring. This last step is an iterative one in order to
insure the desired results are achieved by implementing




The Program Sponsor in OP-506 is typically a Navy Captain
who has spent his entire career flying aircraft and/or
managing aircraft assets in varying capacities. Being a
Program Sponsor for an aircraft program means operating in
a comfortable, familiar environment. This is not the case
relative to aerial targets.
The aerial targets program is assigned as additional
duties to the F-4/F-5/F-8 Program Sponsor within OP-506.
It is unfamiliar, unglamorous, and consumes disproportionate
amounts of the sponsor's time.
This lack of familiarity can be overcome by understanding
the aerial targets mission, the key organizations involved
in aerial target management, and how these organizations
interrelate physically and functionally. Section III of
this report provides this knowledge. Its greatest benefit
and use will be to initiate future Program Sponsors in the
intricacies of aerial targets management.
Additional contributors to the Program Sponsor's aerial
targets management problems are the (1) organizational
structure and C2 ) the lack of attention to several key man-
agement issues.
Organizational structure problems exist within CNO because
of the split of resource and mission sponsorship relative to
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WPN funds, within the program manager's office CAIR-63O)
because of its reporting chain-of-command, and within the
program manager's support staff due to fragmentation.
Marriage of the resource and mission responsibilities/
authority, AIR-63O reporting through AIR-01, and consolida-
tion of NWC and NADC functions at PMTC, respectively, are
the recommended corrective actions.
Whereas the familiarity and organization structure
problems can be solved in the near term, the problems associ-
ated with the management issues addressed in Section V will
only be solved in the long term. The solution to these
issues really involves philosophical changes to the Navy's
concepts of targets and their maintenance, how the threat
is perceived, the benefits of realistic simulation of the
threat, and the importance of training for tomorrow. The
innovations needed to bring about these changes will not
come easily or quickly.
Some improvement in aerial targets management will accrue
from solving the familiarity and structural problems. An
order of magnitude improvement will occur if the key manage-
ment issues are tackled successfully.
The current management organization results from changes
precipitated by environmental factors in 1975. The changes
recommended herein are cast in the context of 198O. If
implemented, a continuous monitoring of their effectiveness
is mandatory as the Navy collides with the rapidly changing








AVIATION PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS DIVISION
Mission : To implement the responsibilities of DCNO (Air
V/arfare) pertaining to the preparation of plans, tactical
doctrine and the definition of requirements to provide
for naval aviation forces (including the Naval Air Reserve)
and their logistic support. Included is the preparation of
budgets and their sponsorship and coordination with pertinent
offices to provide for Integration into the overall Navy
program planning system.
Functions :
1. Prepares plans within the framework of approved
policies, to provide required aviation forces and their
support. (OP-508)
2. Develops and formulates requirements for naval
aircraft, naval aviation weapons, aircraft carriers,
specified aviation type ships and associated aeronautical
equipment, including their material readiness, to fulfill
Navy objectives and to support warfare plans and programs.
(Shipboard equipment and systems for control and navigation
of aircraft in approach and landing phases of operations at
sea are excluded from this functional responsibility.)
COP-506)
3. Prepares requirements for aviation programs and
coordinates other requirements pertaining to the appropria-
tions and budget activities sponsored by the DCNO (Air Warfare)
and supports these requirements before the various military
and civilian budgetary reviewing agencies. (OP-5OI/506/508
)
4. Provides technical cognizance for the conduct of
OPNAV review of aircraft tactical manuals and takes the
necessary action to keep them current. (OP-506)
5. Establishes the operational characteristics of air
weapons systems required to meet approved plans. Initiates
changes required by changes in plans or in probable threats.
Initiates action to upgrade or extend operational capabili-
ties of existing air weapons systems. (OP-506)
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6. Provides program coordination, as defined in the
Navy Programming Manual, for all air programs assigned to
DCNO (Air Vlarfare ) for sponsorship, COP-506)
7. Provides liaison with the Director, RDT&E on
matters affecting aviation programs. (OP-506)
8. Determines air launched nuclear weapons requirements
and monitors readiness of naval air units to maintain and
deliver nuclear weapons. (OP-506)
9. Provides liaison with the Office of the DCNO
(Logistics) on matters affecting air launched weapons
expenditures. (OP-506)
10. Provides liaison for aircraft engine configuration
requirements in support of DCNO (Air Warfare) responsibilities
in the pollution abatement program. COP-506)
11. Coordinates with other offices for integration of
aviation plans, programs and requirements into overall Navy
plans, programs and requirements. (OP-508)
12. Coordinates with other offices in the formulation
of joint, international and Navy plans and policy matters
affecting naval aviation. (OP-508)
13. Advises the DCNO CAir Vlarfare) on the most effective
uses of aviation forces. (OP-508)
14
.
Monitors assigned aviation plans and requirements
and coordinates with OP-59 in order to ensure their timely
and complete fulfillment. COP-506/508)
15. Advises the DCNO (Air Warfare) on policy matters
affecting the fulfillment of his mission, and prepares
positions on policy matters affecting naval aviation.
(OP-501/506/508)
16. Assists in the development of plans and requirements
for aircraft and related material for the Military Assistance
Program. (OP-508/506)
17. Conducts a program of staff studies and analyses
necessary to provide the foundation for naval aviation
plans and programs. COP-501/506/508
)
18. Develops and coordinates the formulation of require-
ments for orderly and effective mobilization planning for





MISSION AND FUNCTION OF THE TARGETS
AND RANGE SYSTEMS DIVISION (63O)
Sec. 1. Director (63O) » Is responsible for the Project
Management of the aerial and surface targets and assigned
range instrumentation systems. These responsibilities
include the following:
A. Providing project management for development, pro-
curement and logistics support of assigned target projects
and assigned instrumentation systems programs.
B. Supporting the operating forces and other Systems
Commands to ensure their range systems improvement and
target requirem.ents are provided consistent with approved
program and funding levels.
C. Providing planning, development, procurement and
logistics support for fleet training range and instrumenta-
tion systems.
D. Developing and recommending priorities within the
program objective memorandum (POM) development cycle and
budget development process submission for all assigned
projects
.
E. Providing technical assistance in planning military
construction, minor construction, special projects and
project-funded construction programs for programs related
to range instrumentation systems under development or
procurement
.
F. Supporting the Director for Resources Division in
developing and coordinating programs, plans and budgets
for range systems and targets programs.
G. Acting as an executive agent for the Assistant
Commander for Test and Evaluation in directing and reviewing
execution of assigned range systems and targets programs and
budgets
.
H. Recommending allocation and reallocation of available
funds for execution of programs in accordance with approved
planning.
Sec. 2. Assistant Director C63QA) . Assists the Director in
administering and coordinating the work of the division.
In the absence of the Director, is responsible for and has
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authority to act for the Director in all matters normally
the responsibility of the Director,
Sec. 3. Targets Branch (63OI) , Is responsible for project
management of targets and target systems. Responsibilities
include
;
A. Providing target systems in response to established
requirements; managing and coordinating the preparation, and
updating and executing approved system plans.
B. Providing management of the technical development,
procurement and logistic support for target systems.
C. Performing continuous evaluation of progress against
plans, cost against funds available, and capability against
design objectives.
D. Approving the scope, schedule and costs proposed by
functional organizations for the accomplishment of project
effort. Directing and ensuring efficient utilization of
manpower, materials and funds pertaining to targets systems.
E. Exercising configuration management control for
target systems.
P. Ensuring that program hardware is certified as ready
for operational evaluation or service use as appropriate.
Sec, 4. Range Systems Branch (6302) . Is responsible for
range instrumentation systems development, procurement and
logistics support. These responsibilities include:
A. Initiating and managing new range instrumentation
development programs in support of range requirements.
B. Coordinating with weapons systems project officers in
monitoring the development of Test and Evaluation Master
Plans (TEMP) and evaluating the impact of this planning on
range instrumentation requirements,
C. Assisting in the preparation, reviewing and coordina-
tion of range development plans in concert with the Director
Resources Division.
D. Coordinating with OPTEVFOR and OPMAV to ensure overall
Navy management cognizance of planned range utilization and
new instrumentation requirements for the Navy elements of




E. Provides configuration management control for
range systems.
Sec. 5. Fleet Support and Procurement Branch (6303) » Is
responsible for providing support to fleet activities in
areas of range instrumentation, targets and training
requirements and procurement support to the target and range
systems branches. Responsibilities include:
A. Providing planning information and recommendations
in the management control of the mobile sea range program
and assets.
B. Providing integrated assessment of range systems
and targets performance and capabilities in support of
DT&E, OT&E and fleet training oriented user requirements,
excluding underwater targets.
C. Assisting in the development of training plans and
exercises to support the requirements identified by the
fleet and other range users.
D. Establishing active and continuing liaison with
range users (Fleet, Navy Material Command, DOD Agencies
and other services) to ensure that the capabilities of the
Navy ranges are made known, duplicative capabilities are
not programmed, and user requirements are recognized and
considered in planning range capability improvements.
E. Preparing procurement documents, initiating procure-
ment actions and maintaining active surveillance of prime
contractors contract performance in support of the Target
and Range Systems Branches.
F. Maintaining active surveillance of field activities
to ensure procurement initiation, production and delivery
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